an incentive to appreciate the terms of trade, so as to lower in°ation. But in equilibrium everyone behaves symmetrically and the e®ects on the terms of trade are balanced, while employment is low. In our micro-founded model a further domestic monetary expansion has a negative welfare e®ect on the home country | because the excessive depreciation of the terms of trade and the increase in production o®set the gains in higher consumption | and it has a non ambiguous positive e®ect on foreign welfare | because it raises consumption and it improves the terms of trade. This positive externality, which contrasts with the popular`beggar-thy-neighbour' devaluation, is at the root of the ine±ciency of the non cooperative allocation 3 . Only by cooperating, in a centralized or decentralized way, the two policymakers can eliminate the distortions of the terms of trade.
We¯rst consider a symmetric¯xed exchange system | a form of decentralized cooperation | which in a world of preset wages and prices translates directly into a¯xed terms of trade. In this framework both countries will boast their economies until real wages hit the competitive level: internalizing the distortion of the terms of trade allows also to eliminate the distortion given by the monopolistic competition. As in Rogo® (1985) , cooperation reduces the incentive to contract the money supply, moreover it is not always welfare improving for both countries. But this is not the end of the story; it is possible to improve upon this solution by relinquish the sovereignty in the decisions of monetary policy to a supranational institution. In this command optimum, it is not the case that the competitive level is reached: the larger 4 country may maintain some monopolistic distortion while the smaller country will always reach the competitive level.
The work is organized as follows. In the next two sections, the Corsetti and Pesenti model is brie°y outlined following their paper. Section IV discusses the non cooperative Nash equilibrium and its sub-optimality properties. The section V is centred on the symmetric cooperative¯xed exchange solution. Finally the last section analyses the centralized solution as the way to obtain the higher global welfare without impairing the satisfaction of some natural participation constraints.
Building blocks of the model
In this section we brie°y outline the key building blocks of the model following Corsetti and Pesenti [1997] which embeds all the features of the paradigm to the new international macroeconomics started by Obstfeld and Rogo® [1995] . The latter model is the¯rst that allows a formal welfare evaluation of international macroeconomic policies using an intertemporal approach, with nominal price rigidities and micro-foundations of aggregate supply 5 .
Preferences
The model includes two countries, Home and Foreign, each specialized in the production of a single traded good. In each country there is a continuum of economic agents, with population size normalized to 1. Home agents are indexed by j, Foreign agents by j ¤ . The lifetime utility of Home agent j is given by
Here¯is the discount rate, equal to (1 + ±) ¡1 where ± is the rate of time preference; 1=½ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution; C is a consumption index;`denotes the amounts of labour supplied by the agent.
Within countries, agents have symmetric preferences and constraints. Across countries, individuals preferences are only symmetric over consumption goods while preferences towards liquidity and leisure are dissimilar.
Home agents' wealth is allocated among two assets, real money holdings, M=P , and an internationally traded bond denominated in composite consumption units (denoted B in what follows). Home money is exclusively held by Home agents while the international bond is in zero net-supply worldwide. Real money balances enter in the utility function and they provide liquidity services.
Consumption and price indexes
The Cobb-Douglas consumption index for the Home agent is de¯ned as
where C H (j) and C F (j) are domestic consumption of the Home good and the Foreign good by individual j. Preferences on the two goods are identical across countries:
¡°T he consumption-based price indexes that correspond to the above speci¯cation of preferences 6 are
¡° ( 1) where°W´°°(1 ¡°) (1¡°) . In equations (1), P H is the price of Home good in domestic currency, P ¤ F is the price of Foreign good in local currency, and E is the nominal exchange rate (domestic currency per unit of foreign currency).
Production and market structure
Production of the domestic good requires a continuum of di®erentiated labour inputs that are supplied by domestic agents. Technology is described by a linear-homogeneous CES production function. For the Home country, we have
where Y denotes output per capita and the parameter Á is the elasticity of input substitution. While national¯rms act competitively, each economic agent is a monopoly supplier of one type of labour input.
The labour demand for each type of agent is
where W (j) is the nominal wage rate. In a symmetric equilibrium nominal wages are equal to product prices whether wages are sticky or°exible. In the short run, the economies of both countries are characterized by predetermined nominal wages which are assumed to be¯xed only for one period (short run). For the analysis that follows it is crucial to note that the size of the policy shocks is not unbounded: any monetary expansion that could lead real wages below the marginal cost in term of utility is ruled out.
Solving the model
The model is solved considering an initial steady-state equilibrium in which the net bond position of each country is zero. It is then possible to study the impact of permanent, unanticipated changes in domestic or foreign money.
The new steady-state levels of these variables are denoted with ¹ M , ¹ M ¤ . The model is described by the following block of equations.
The Euler equation are:
where r is the short-run real interest rate, namely the rate of return on an international bond indexed to the composite consumption good. In the short run, equilibrium in the money markets requires
where the nominal interest rate 1 + i, is de¯ned as the product of the real return on the bond (1 + r) and the CPI in°ation rate ( ¹ P =P ). In the long run, the money market equilibrium conditions become:
where the long-run nominal interest rate in both countries is equal to the rate of time preference ±. In the short-run the current account identities are:
where B is the net bond position. Since the initial net bond position is zero, the short-run current account°ow is equivalent to the end-of-period asset position B. In the long run, the steady-state consumption level is equal to output plus net interest payments to (or from) the rest of the world:
where ± is the steady-state real interest rate. The relation between short-run and long-run asset positions can be determined by using the current account equation for the post-shock period (shocks last one period) as
Due to the constant elasticity of substitution of the consumption index, the short-run and long-run aggregate equilibrium conditions in the goods markets can be written as follows:
while the equilibrium conditions in the labour market can be written as:
Conditions (9) may not hold in the short run. They always holds, however, in the long run, when wages (and goods prices) fully adjust to their equilibrium levels. Since our analysis focuses on unanticipated policy shocks, it is logically consistent to assume that wages in the short run are set at the level consistent with the pre-shock steady-state equilibrium. By using the equilibrium conditions above it is possible to obtain the reduced form equations for the model following Corsetti and Pesenti's approach. The relevant results for the analysis of welfare are summarized in Table 1 and Table 2 .
Non cooperative solution to monetary interdependence
We start analysing the interaction between the Home and Foreign country in the non cooperative Nash equilibrium, where each policymaker attempts 
Long-run real balances .. 
Long-run real balances 
to maximize its own country's welfare with respect to money supply, taking as given the policy of the other policymaker. In the case of monetary policy shocks we can simply focus on the short run indirect utilities: monetary policy has no e®ect on real variables once wages adjust in the long run. The assumption that the policymaker is benevolent, i.e. that it maximizes the welfare of the representative consumer, can be subject to criticisms (Blinder [1997] ). We pursue this approach in order to preserve the microfoundations, knowing that it will narrow the set of possible monetary policy targets. Notwithstanding this fact, we will show that our assumption implies goals like the terms of trade and real output. The maximization of the indirect utility of the Home representative consumer with respect to M , disregarding liquidity e®ects, yields the followinḡ rst order condition
while for the Foreign representative consumer we obtain
Noting that the conditions 1 = kC
2 imply the equalization between the real wage and the marginal cost of labour in term of utility 7 , it is possible to infer that in a Nash equilibrium both economies are operating under monopolistic competition. The policymakers contract their policies too much, the resulting level of output is too low and above the e±cient competitive level. Here we de¯ne D and D
as the`open-economy distortions' respectively for the Home and Foreign consumers. These distortions are the results of the strategic interactions in 7 We can reshape these conditions, respectively for the Home and Foreign consumers, as
an open economy:°is a degree of openness of the economies while ½ measures the degree of substitutability between the monetary policies of the two countries. Here is crucial to note the di®erence between a closed and an open economy setting. As°! 1 (i.e. the Home country is closed), the optimal unanticipated monetary policy will be to get rid of all the monopolistic distortions, nothing more than Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) . In an open economy model there is another transmission channel to consider: the terms of trade. A monetary expansion in the Home country increases consumption and it depreciates the terms of trade impairing Home purchasing power. The Home country can consume more by increasing output. The increased disutility of extending more e®ort reduces the incentive to expand monetary policy. There are cases in which starting from the long-run equilibrium it is optimal to reduce the money supply, contradicting in this way the closed economy results 8 . We can derive the relative unanticipated money innovation in the non cooperative solution taking the ratio of (10) and (11) and using the reduced 8 I am grateful to Paolo Pesenti and Cedric Tille for pointing out this result. If we compute the derivative of the Home utility with respect to its own money supply at the long run equilibrium, we observe that it will be optimal to contract the money supply if and only if
where we have de¯ned
In a closed economy D = 1 and the inequality above is never satis¯ed.
As the`openeconomy distortions' increase, the inequality can be satis¯ed. Note that if the inequality is satis¯ed as equality | which might be the case only in an open economy | it is possible to de¯ne the existence of a time-consistent equilibrium for any arbitrary initial condition on the money supply. Time-consistent or sustainable equilbria have also been de¯ned in closed economy models superimposing an upper bound on the money supply, as in Ireland (1997) . In our context we leave wages as a predetermined, not forward looking variable, and we analyse the optimal stabilization policy of unanticipated monetary policy disturbances, as in Canzoneri and Henderson (1991) .
forms of Table 1 and 2, obtaining
In the short run either the exchange rate or the terms of trade (see Table  1 and 2) are proportional to (12): so they are functions 10 of the monopolistic and`open-economy' distortions; moreover M R N has a monotone relation with the relative size of the countries, i.e. the larger is the Home country the more the relative money innovation and the terms of trade will be biased in its favour and the more the Home country will operate near competitive standards.
After substituting (12) into (10) it is possible to obtain the equilibrium level of money in the global economy as
The need for a coordinated action in monetary policy clearly emerges in this context: when the Home policymaker acts alone, any further expansion in the money innovation decreases its welfare, and in some cases can generate phenomena of`immiserizing growth', due to the deterioration of the terms of trade. Only when the policy expansion is coordinated with the Foreign authority it is possible to obtain an improvement in welfare.
Here we search for an allocation that constitutes a Pareto improvement. Just consider an expansion in the money supply for both countries which leaves unaltered the exchange rate of the Nash equilibrium. In order to 9 Given a generic f and f ¤ , respectively for the Home and Foreign country, we de¯ne
If we add¯scal policy shocks, the relative money expansion will be
The relation between the term of trade and the indexes of¯scal policy will be crucial when in future works we will analyse the optimal¯scal expansion, including the interaction between optimal¯scal policy and optimal monetary policy.
evaluate if this allocation increases the welfare for both countries, we compute the derivative of the indirect utility for the Home and Foreign countries with respect to M and M ¤ respectively, leaving M R = M R N and we evaluate the derivative at the Nash equilibrium, obtaining
where we have used (10) . In the Nash equilibrium both countries restrict their monetary policy too much: they do not internalize the positive externalities given by a coordinated expansion. This result resembles the contractionary bias¯ndings of the Keynesian literature on international policy coordination (Canzoneri and Henderson [1991] ), however the intuition is similar to Obstfeld and Rogo® [1996] : since an equiproportionate money shock has no e®ect on the terms of trade, the only e®ect is on consumption and output, but under monopolistic competition in the factor market, output is too low; it follows that this kind of expansion has a¯rst order e®ect on the global welfare. It is worth reminding how the conclusions of Obstfeld and Rogo® [1996] concern only small perturbations around the steady state, while in this context larger shocks cannot be ruled out. It is then possible to improve the welfare also for larger shocks provided that the terms of trade does not change.
Another useful implication of (14) is that insofar as both countries maintain monopolistic power it is possible to¯nd an allocation that constitutes a Pareto improvement. In fact (14), if evaluated at any allocation where a country is at a monopolistic level of production, is always valid. We stress how the conclusion about a possible improvement is true only when agents in both countries maintain their monopolistic power: in fact any expansion is bounded by the requirement that agents' real wages do not fall below their marginal cost in term of utility. When at least one country reaches the competitive level, it may be not possible to¯nd an improvement. The constraint on the real wage will then be binding. The analysis above suggests as a possible e±cient allocation the solution in which the policymakers restrain themselves from the possibility of in°uencing the terms of trade.
5 Cooperative solution in a decentralized setting.
Here we consider a solution where both countries agree on a¯xed terms of trade. In this solution both countries act in the same way: there is no leader and the relative money innovation is determined simultaneously by their best responses.
Computing the derivative of the indirect utility for the Home and Foreign countries with respect to their money supplies taking the relative prices as given, we obtain as¯rst order conditions:
Both policymakers will¯nd optimal to increase their production until the real wage is equal to the marginal cost in terms of utility, i.e. the competitive level. Internalizing the externalities in the terms of trade allows them also to eliminate the distortions given by the monopolistic competition. The ratio of (15) and (16) determines the optimal relative money innovation under such cooperative agreement
which is independent of the relative size of the economies and of the interdependence parameter ½. Not surprisingly we have internalized the`openeconomy distortions'. The exchange rate represents the factor that equilibrates the structural asymmetries in the monopoly power between the countries and, when we add¯scal policies, the asymmetries in the indexes of¯scal stances. The optimal global money expansion is
Using (17) and (18) we can simplify the solution of the Nash equilibrium as
The terms of trade in the two solutions will be equal only if°= 0:5, otherwise in the Nash equilibrium it will be proportional to°(the size of the Home country) for any ½, i.e. the larger is the Home country, the more the terms of trade of the Home country will be depreciated. Instead the global money expansion will be always less in the non cooperative solution due to the contractionary bias. The result that cooperation increases the global money expansion is familiar with the Keynesian literature on international policy coordination: as Rogo® (1985) pointed out, cooperation may remove the disincentive to in°ate. With Rogo® (1985) we also share the¯ndings that an increased cooperation not necessarily increases the welfare in either country. Here we discuss the determinants of our results in terms of the structural parameters of the model. Using (19) and (20) we can compare the welfare between the two regimes. In the cooperative solution for the Home country we have
while in the Nash equilibrium
It can be shown relying on a graphical simulation of U N and U F that the choice between the two regimes can be related to the size of the country (°) and to the elasticity of substitution (½). In particular the equation U N = U F de¯nes implicitly a function°L :¨! ¢, where¨is the set of admissible ½, and ¢ is the set of admissible°. For any ½ it is possible to¯nd a unique°w hich allows to discriminate between the two solutions. The function°L is always smaller than 1=2. For value of°greater than°L the Home consumer will prefer the cooperative solution to the Nash one's. Symmetrically for the Foreign country, the equation (U ¤ ) N = (U ¤ ) F de¯nes implicitly a function°H always greater than 1=2. For values of°less than°H, the Foreign consumer will prefer the cooperative solution. It is then possible to determine a region of values of°centred around 1=2, (°L;°H), in which the cooperative solution is Pareto dominant. The intuition on why the cooperative solution is better than the Nash solution for countries not so dissimilar in size can be understood in the following way. When the Home country is small, under the Nash equilibrium, it will operate far above the competitive level due to an appreciation of the terms of trade; on the other hand it will bene¯t from larger consumption because the Foreign country will boast its economy near the competitive level. Moreover the appreciation of the terms of trade will not impair its purchasing power:`it will consume without working'. It follows that for low values of°, the Home consumer will prefer the Nash allocation to the cooperative allocation, symmetrically for the Foreign country.
We can now analyse the credibility issue, i.e. the absence of feasible deviations. Starting from the`supposed' equilibrium, we analyse if for one country is possible to increase the welfare given that the other country reacts with best responses. The Nash solution, being an equilibrium, is de¯nitely credible. For the cooperative agreement the credibility issue can be handled by solving the following problem
where the constraint can be simpli¯ed
in fact in this kind of solution the policymaker takes the terms of trade as given. The best response maps from M R to the choice of the money expansion. After plugging this expression in the indirect utility function, we maximize with respect to M R and evaluate the derivative at the original competitive solution, the expression resulting is
In order to improve the welfare of the competitive solution, the Home policymaker must appreciate the terms of trade, appreciation that, from the initial allocation, leads to an increase in real wages. It follows that this deviation is feasible and that the competitive solution is not an equilibrium (a symmetric reasoning can be applied to the Foreign country). The derivatives above is also meaningful for the analysis of the`¯xed exchange rate as a leadership commitment' ¶ a la Canzoneri and Gray [1985] . In this kind of solution the follower takes as given the exchange rate following the reaction function (21), the leader implicitly maximizes the optimal exchange rate. In our context the follower will reach the competitive level while the leader will maintain monopolistic power.
We leave for future researches the implementation of these solutions through the use of a contractual scheme (see Persson and Tabellini [1995] for an overview of the techniques). Here we remark instead how the cooperative solution even if Pareto e±cient might be not robust to a compensation test. We search for the existence and feasibility of an allocation that is potentially Pareto preferred, where x is said to be potentially Pareto preferred to x 0 if it exists a compensation scheme originated from x that leads to an allocation that Pareto improves upon x 0 . We start considering forms of cooperative solutions in a centralized setting, in particular we introduce the possibility of delegating monetary policy to a third authority which attempts to maximize the welfare of the global economy. This centralized setting can be viewed as interpreted as a monetary union (Persson and Tabellini [1995] ), where we leave aside the microeconomic bene¯ts, such e.g. elimination of transaction costs, and we concentrate on the stabilization problem. Why should a country accept to relinquish its sovereignty in the decisions of monetary policy? We make the assumption that any country will participate if the utility it obtains is at least the utility associated with the Nash equilibrium. Delegation avoids the incentive compatible constraint of any decentralized solution, but it asks for the satisfaction of an individual rationality constraint.
Delegating monetary policy to a supranational institution
We go deeper in to the analysis of cooperative equilibria and we analyse a scenario in which the monetary policy decisions are delegated to a supranational monetary institution which has the objective of maximizing the global welfare. We de¯ne as global welfare the convex combination of the utilities of the Home and Foreign countries where the weights will be constrained by the solution. This allocation must satisfy a participation constraint for each country: the utility must be at least the utility of the Nash equilibrium. We can decompose the analysis into two steps: we¯rst compute all the e±cient allocations and then we add the participation constraints.
The central authority will maximize with respect to M R and M W the following welfare function
where ® 2 [0; 1] represents the weight attributed to the Home consumer utility. The maximum will be constrained by the usual condition that the equilibrium real wage for both representative agents will not fall below the marginal cost in term of utility, i.e.
The Lagrangian for this problem can be written as
The¯rst order conditions are
2°= 0 When¸> 0 and¸¤ > 0 the two constraints are binding and the allocation is the same we have in a decentralized setting with the two policymakers cooperating on the¯xed terms of trade (as in the previous paragraph). In this context the only feasible choice of ® has to be consistent with the equation
When¸= 0 and¸¤ = 0, the two¯rst order conditions boil down to
By using the relation C C ¤ =°1 ¡°a nd after substituting (22) into (23) it is possible to obtain
but these conditions are never satis¯ed simultaneously: i.e. there is no efcient equilibrium where both countries maintain monopolistic power. This result validates the intuition we had before: in a cooperative solution both countries internalize the negative externalities given by the possibility of distorting the terms of trade. In this way they can push the global money expansion to the point where at least one of the two countries reaches the competitive level.
When¸> 0 and¸¤ = 0, after a manipulation of the¯rst order conditions, we obtain
where the inequality is true if and only if
which is true if and only if
³°1 ¡°´½ the competitive solution will prevail in both economies. It is interesting to focus on the implementation of the competitive solution in this centralized setting: if the two monetary policy instruments are substitutes (½ < 1), 11 the weight ® given to the Home country will be less than its size°; if the latter is bigger than 1=2 (while it will be higher if the size is less than 1=2); vice versa if the monetary policy instruments are complements (½ > 1): the weight will be higher than the size if the latter is higher than 1=2 (and it will be less if°is less than 1=2).
So far we have proved the existence of a continuum of e±cient equilibria described by the parameter ®: If the weight given to the Home utility in the social welfare is high, the Home country will retain the monopolistic power while the Foreign real wages will reach the competitive level; vice versa if the weight is biased towards the Foreign country. Among this continuum of equilibria it will be interesting to select the one (or more than one) which maximizes the global welfare function given the structure of the economy. In order to proceed in our analysis, we have to compute the indirect utility function for both countries.
A special case: ½ = 1
We analyse before the case where the consumption utility is logarithmic: the intratemporal and intertemporal elasticity of substitution are equalized and in the Nash equilibrium there is no strategic interdependence. This does not preclude the existence of spillover e®ects. In what follows ¤ = 1¡°1 ¡®
and -=°® :
We start considering the equilibria where ® <°. By using the ratio of the two¯rst order conditions in (24), we can write the relative money innovation as
while the global money expansion is given by
When ® >°, using the ratio of the two¯rst order condition in (25), it is possible to express the relative money innovation as
e can compact the indirect utility functions for the Home and Foreign consumers as
if ®¸°(
27)
The Home utility function is increasing in ®, and it is convex for ® ·°and concave for ®¸°1 2 ; while the Foreign utility function is decreasing in ® and it is concave for ® ·°and convex for ®¸°1 3 . If the decision power is left to the single country, both countries will¯nd optimal to retain all the bargaining power enlarging then their monopolistic distortions.
12 If ® ·°, it can be shown that 
and
We analyse the shape of the social welfare function by combining (26) and (27)
t can be shown that on both intervals the function is convex, implying that the optimal choice is a "bang-bang" solution, i.e. we have to compare the global utility at the end points of the interval [0; 1].
The optimal choice of ® can be summarized in
If the size of the Home country is larger than the Foreign, all the bargaining power will be given to the Home country which will retain the monopolistic power, while agents in the small country will operate under competitive wages; vice versa if the Home country is smaller.
The solution above represents only the¯rst step in the characterization of this form of cooperative solution, since every solutions must satisfy the individual participation constraints: both countries must obtain at least the utility level of the Nash equilibrium.
We then add the following constraints:
if ®¸°U Figure 1 shows 14 how the participation constraints restrict the set of feasible contracts. For any°, it is possible to determine an interval for ®, where the utility for both countries is above the utility associated with a Nash equilibrium: in this set we have to maximize the global welfare. Due to the considerations above and to the convexity of the global welfare function, the solution will be a corner solution .The constraints (28) and (30) will be binding when°· 1 2 , in fact when the Home country is relatively small, it will be put on its reservation level; while constraints (29) and (31) will be binding when°¸1 2 .
The optimal solution is summarized (using Figure 2 ) in this way: 14 We can simplify (28) and (29) using the indirect utility computed in the Nash equilibrium
while (30) and (31) can be simpli¯ed in°l
The constraints (28) and (30) are continuous in ® =°; also (29) and (31) are continuous in ® =°. Figure 3 compares the optimal constrained global welfare to the welfare when both countries operate at the competitive level.
c) centralized solution are`more' welfare improving when countries are not too dissimilar in size, otherwise the utility will converge to the Nash utility also for the larger country.
The general case
It is interesting to study how the conclusion above are robust to di®erent degrees of interdependence between countries (the algebra is presented in the appendix). It is possible to prove that also in this case the global welfare function is convex in ® for both ranges, which implies that the optimal choice of ® is a corner solution as it is the case when ½ = 1: It is then possible to generalize the results of the previous section. In order to maximize the worldwide welfare function, disregarding the participation constraints, all the weight must be given to the country with larger size. If we add the participation constraints the analysis becomes a bit di±cult to handle. Notwithstanding this complexity, it is possible to show that also in this general case the country of smaller size will hit the implicit constraint given by the Nash utility, while the larger country will operate under monopolistic competition. An interesting and appealing result is that the set of feasible weight will become larger as ½ increase. This relation between strategical interdependence and enforcement of the cooperative solution deserves further intuition. When the monetary policy instruments are strategical complements, they do not need to be coordinated, what a country does for itself is bene¯cial also for the other country. It follows that in a centralized solution is possible to give more`power' to one country without reducing the utility of the other one. When monetary policies are strategical substitutes, there is more need for coordination, this will restrict the set of feasible weights. In fact in this case, there is a con°ict between giving the`power' to the larger country and not impairing the utility of the smaller country with an adverse choice of the monetary policy instrument. The optimal solution resolves this con°ict.
Conclusions
In this paper we have caught the impulse to the international economics literature given by Obstfeld and Rogo® [1995] and Corsetti and Pesenti [1997] . Our e®ort has been an attempt to show how a model with imperfect competition and nominal rigidities can be useful and powerful in addressing normative analyses. We have focused on monetary shocks with the aim of reviving the literature on international policy coordination in a micro-founded model. Several are the similarities: the contractionary bias of the Nash equilibrium, the ine±ciency of the non cooperative allocation, the welfare improvement in the centralized solution. Di®erents are the explanations: all the conclusions can be read in term of the interactions between the monopolistic distortions and the terms of trade externalities with a speci¯c attention given to the di®erent sizes of the countries and to the degree of substitutability of their policies. It is not the case that eliminating the monopolistic distortions leads to the best allocation in term of welfare: in the command optimum, some of the monopolistic power has to be left to the larger country.
More light has to be shed on the optimal determination of the¯scal policy either in a non cooperative or in a cooperative setting: this will enlarge and enrich the number of possible outcomes and it will allow us to study scenarios of inconsistency between¯scal policy and monetary policy. The model can also be extended to a three-country environment, in order to study the interaction between EMU and USA, or to include mechanism of vote or coalitions between countries belonging to the same area. In this framework it can be possible also to analyse the impact on the monetary policy of the Stability Pact, as in the future monetary union.
In our framework we have only focused on monetary shocks but the immediate following step is to model productivity or demand shocks and to study the optimal stabilization policy. Once shocks and asymmetric information are added, the contract theory will provide good insights in modelling the trade-o® between e±ciency and informational rents. But the most ambitious step will be the analysis of the strategic interaction between the policymaker and the wage setters, and so the possibility of addressing issues like timeinconsistency. while the global money expansion is given by
the indirect utility function for the Home country is
for the Foreign country instead we have
, using the ratio of the two¯rst order condition in (25), it is possible to express the exchange rate as
he indirect utility function for the Home country is
we can summarize the results as
(A.1)
Note that the utility functions are continuos in while if
From these equations it is possible to retrieve the similarities with the case analysed in the text. 
Gamma Utility
Global utility when both countries are at the competitive level
Global utility under the optimal centralized solution
